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1 Introduction 
 The disposition effect describes investors’ common tendency of selling a winning investment 
too soon and holding on to losing investments too long (Shefrin and Statman 1985). Previous literature 
has documented the disposition effect for various tasks and investor types, including individual as well 
as professional investors. (See e.g. Odean 1998, Weber and Camerer 1998, Genesove and Mayer 2001, 
and Garvey and Murphy 2004 for evidence regarding individual stock market investors, student sub-
jects in an individual choice experiment, house holders, and professional stock market investors, re-
spectively.) Lately, research has shifted from studying aggregate behavior towards investigating indi-
vidual behavior, especially relating individual disposition effect with investors’ sophistication (see, 
e.g. Dhar and Zhu 2006, Feng and Seasholes 2005, Seru, Shumway and Stoffman 2007, and Leal, 
Armada and Duque 2008).  
From its definition (“selling winners too soon – holding losers too long”), the disposition ef-
fect consists of two sides, one concerning gains and the other concerning losses. In research on the 
disposition effect the two sides of the biases are treated as symmetric. While a non-disposition investor 
is unbiased in his selling decisions, a high-disposition investor is usually assumed to both selling win-
ners quickly and to be reluctant to realize losers. There is some indication in the literature that both 
sides of the effect are not perfectly correlated, e.g. Feng and Seasholes (2005) show that experience 
and sophistication have different effects on the behavior in the gain and loss domain (see Dhar and 
Zhu 2006 for related findings). However, a thorough investigation of the dependency of behavior in 
the gain and in the loss domain based on individual level data is still missing.  
Using field as well as experimental data, we show that investors’ reactions towards capital 
gains are uncorrelated to their reactions towards capital losses, indicating that the disposition effect 
should be better classified as two separate biases. In a more detailed analysis, we find that both sides 
of the disposition effect are not merely random but stable on an individual level, which classifies both 
biases as stable personality traits. Investors who are extremely reluctant to sell their losers in one year 
in our field data study or one task of the individual choice experiment also appear to be reluctant in 
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later years or other tasks, respectively. We also find that learning attenuates the effects over time and 
that certain investor characteristics affect and explain investors’ reactions towards gains and losses.  
Our results are important both for research and practical applications. In research, these find-
ings are especially useful for multi-agent models that focus on the relationship between individual 
biases and market measures, e.g. Grinblatt and Han (2005). In practice, banks providing investment 
advice to their customers could especially benefit from our contribution. 
As indicated, we use two different data sets, i.e. research methodologies. First, we analyze 
trading behavior of actual stock market investors. Our field data is based on purchase and selling 
transactions of about 3,000 individual investors from a German online broker covering the period from 
January 1997 to April 2001. We are also provided with some personal characteristics concerning these 
investors (age, gender, investment experience, income, and investment strategy). Second, we analyze 
individual level disposition effects in an individual choice experiment. The experiment consists of two 
parts that are separated by a four-week interval to test for time stability. In each part of the experiment, 
our 113 student subjects are confronted with two different individual choice tasks. The tasks are espe-
cially designed to measure individual disposition effects and differ in multi-dimensions to capture a 
broad spectrum of how disposition effects might emerge. While the first task is similar to the stock 
market design of Weber and Camerer (1998), the second task consists of sequences of simple lottery 
choices framed as a housing task.  
Both methodologies have advantages and disadvantages. The most important benefits of the 
field data analysis are that it deals with the population we really want to study, i.e. individual inves-
tors, and that it spans more than four years of data. However, it is generally difficult to distinguish 
whether certain effects in the field, or certain individual behaviors, are driven by biased preferences or 
biased expectations. The laboratory, on the other hand, gives us the opportunity to control for different 
explanations, especially expectations, so that we are able to compare actual behavior to a strict rational 
benchmark. The experiment, in addition, also allows us to study research questions for which there is 
no field data available, i.e. stability across tasks. Drawbacks of the experimental method are the short 
time interval between the two parts of the experiment, and the fact that our subjects are students in-
stead of real investors. We believe that the combination of both methodologies, i.e. field and experi-
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ment, eliminates most concerns and alternative explanations and therefore provides a strong robust-
ness check for all our findings. 
Our analysis is conducted in the following way: For both data sets, we measure the extent to 
which an investor exhibits the disposition effect as the difference between proportions of winners and 
losers realized. Proportions of winners (losers) realized are calculated as the number of times an inves-
tor sells at a gain (loss), divided by the number of opportunities to do so (see e.g. Odean 1998). We 
replicate known results showing that both investors in the field and subjects in the individual choice 
tasks tend to sell their winners far more often than their losers. In the field, winners are 50 % more 
likely to be realized, while in the experiment, winners are twice as likely to be cashed in. As our main 
contribution we find, that those investors selling their winners too soon are not the same investors who 
hold their losers too long. The two sides of the disposition effect are thus not entangled with one 
another which is true for both settings.  
In the next step, we apply a stability analysis within tasks, across tasks, and across time by 
correlating individual attitudes in the gain and loss domain across different years in the field, different 
rounds of the same task, different tasks, or different parts of the experiment, respectively. Our results 
suggest that the two, independent building blocks of the disposition effect, i.e. investors’ attitude for 
cashing in their gains quite quickly and their loss realization aversion, are indeed stable for all the 
tested dimensions. In accordance with prior research (see e.g. Dhar and Zhu 2006 and Shumway and 
Wu 2006) we also find that individual disposition effects decrease with trading experience. Investors 
who are engaged in frequent trading realize their winners more and their losers less readily. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review related literature and constitute our 
hypotheses. We describe our field data set, as well as the experimental design and procedure, in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 discusses our results and section 5 draws conclusions.  
2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
The term “disposition effect” dates back to Shefrin and Statman (1985). Stock market inves-
tors exhibit the tendency to sell their winning stocks too early and hold on to their losing stocks too 
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long.2 Since Shefrin and Statman (1985), the disposition effect has been replicated in a variety of dif-
ferent economic settings, such as stock markets, housing markets, or economic experiments. It has also 
been replicated for different investor types, including individual investors as well as professionals, and 
for many different countries. 
Heisler (1994) documents the disposition effect among small speculators in the U.S. treasury 
bond futures market. He shows that these investors hold trades with an initial paper loss significantly 
longer than trades that show an initial profit. Odean (1998) uses individual level discount broker data 
to discover that individual stock market investors in the U.S. stick to their loser stocks while selling 
their winner stocks. He also shows that rational explanations, like stock market mean reversion, port-
folio rebalancing, or trading costs, do not seem to drive the results. Odean’s findings have been repli-
cated for the Australian (Brown, Chappel, da Silva Rosa, and Walter 2002), Chinese (Chen, Kim, Nof-
singer, and Rui 2007), Finnish (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001), and Israeli (Shapira and Venezia 2001) 
stock markets.  
While these studies mainly investigate trading behavior of individual investors, there is another 
stream of literature which looks at behavioral biases among professionals. Garvey and Murphy (2004) 
show that U.S. proprietary stock traders hold on to their losers too long and sell their winners too soon. 
Coval and Shumway (2005) find that Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders take above-average 
afternoon risk to recover from morning losses, a behavior related to the disposition effect. Disposition 
effects for professional future traders are documented by Frino, Johnstone, and Zheng (2004), Locke 
and Mann (2005), as well as Locke and Onayev (2005). 
The disposition effect, however, does not only apply to financial markets, but also to different 
economic situations, such as housing markets or economic experiments. Genesove and Mayer (2001) 
find a disposition effect in the housing market in downtown Boston in the 1960s. Weber and Camerer 
(1998) investigate the disposition effect within an individual choice experiment and show that it is 
mainly driven by their subjects’ unwillingness to close a position at a loss. Once subjects are forced to 
close all their positions in each trading period, but later given the opportunity to reopen them, the ef-
                                                     
2  See Barberis and Xiong (2008) for a detailed formal discussion on the relation between prospect theory and 
the disposition effect.  
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fect weakens significantly. Weber and Zuchel (2005) document that risk taking after gains and losses 
is highly affected by economic frames. When subjects are confronted with a stock market frame, they 
tend to exhibit the disposition effect. If the same decision is presented in a lottery frame, however, risk 
taking after gains exceeds risk taking following losses. 
Different from the previous literature, our paper focuses on the two sub-effects contributing to 
the disposition effect, i.e. the behavior on the gain side vs. the behavior on the loss side. Besides repli-
cating the mere existence of the disposition effect (hypothesis 1), hypothesis 2 therefore asks for 
symmetry of the effect in the gain and loss domain. The question is whether investors who exhibit the 
disposition effect do so because they sell winners too early, losers too late, or both: 
Hypothesis 1: Individual investors realize their gains quicker than they realize their losses. 
Hypothesis 2: Investors who exhibit the disposition effect tend to both sell their winners too 
early and their losers too late. 
Whether or not we find symmetry, we need to check for stability to show that individual differ-
ences across investors are not merely random but stable personality traits. To our knowledge, there is 
no study that compares individual level disposition effects and its two building blocks across different 
settings, e.g. the stock and the housing market. In addition, it is quite unclear whether individual biases 
are stable within tasks, e.g. across different market regimes, and across time. Some evidence that the 
disposition effect might be time stable comes from Shumway and Wu (2006), who analyze individual 
account data from a Chinese brokerage firm. The authors document that individual investors’ disposi-
tion effects, measured using one year of data, forecast these investors’ disposition effects in subse-
quent years.  
For testing stability within tasks, we first analyze whether experimental subjects who exhibit a 
relatively strong disposition effect, preference for cashing-in gains, or loss realization aversion within 
one round of a task are also highly affected in other rounds of the same task. Second, we test whether 
individual level effects are stable across the two different tasks. Furthermore, by repeating the experi-
ment four weeks later and by analyzing our field data set, we are able to test for time stability. Our 
three stability hypotheses are therefore the following: 
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Hypothesis 3a: (Stability within tasks) Preferences for cashing-in gains and loss realization 
aversions are stable within tasks. 
Hypothesis 3b: (Stability across tasks) Preferences for cashing-in gains and loss realization 
aversions are stable across different tasks. 
Hypothesis 3c: (Stability across time) Preferences for cashing-in gains and loss realization 
aversions are stable across time. 
We also investigate whether and how learning attenuates individual investors’ tendencies for 
selling winners and holding losers. Although individual level disposition effects might be time stable 
on a relative level, it might be that investors learn over time, thus lowering the disposition effect on 
aggregate. Learning might be induced by the performance penalty investors have to pay when exhibit-
ing this bias (Camerer 1990). Recent literature tests whether the disposition effect diminishes with 
increasing investment sophistication, using proxies like investment size, trading frequency, age, 
wealth, or professional occupation. Evidence on this issue, however, is mixed. While Brown et al. 
(2006), Dhar and Zhu (2006), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Shapira and Venezia (2001), and 
Shumway and Wu (2006) claim that sophistication indeed weakens the disposition effect, Chen et al. 
(2007) find an opposite effect for the Chinese market. We apply hypothesis 4 to test for learning with-
in tasks and over time both with our field data and our experimental data set: 
Hypothesis 4: Learning decreases disposition effects on aggregate. While investors hold on 
to their winners more often, they are more likely to sell their losers. 
3 Data 
3.1 Field Data 
Our field data study is based on three data sets: A data set containing purchase and selling trans-
actions of 3,079 individual investors from a German online broker covering the period of January 
1997 to April 2001, a second data set containing voluntarily self-reported investor characteristics col-
lected by the online broker when the investor opened the account (age, gender, investment experience, 
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income, and investment strategy), and a third data set containing price information from Datastream 
on the securities traded. 
(insert table 1 about here) 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of those 2,978 investors who enter our analysis. We con-
sider all investors who traded in stocks listed in Euro or German Marks. The table also provides de-
scriptive statistics on trades and portfolios. Note that, since our investors hold an average (median) 
number of only 5.52 (4.29) stocks in their portfolios, they seem largely indifferent to diversification. 
More information on our field data set can be found in Glaser (2003). 
3.2   Experimental Data 
We measure individual level disposition effects in two different individual choice treatments: A 
multiperiod investment task similar to Weber and Camerer (1998) and a framed housing task. In the 
following we explain these experimental designs as well as the experimental procedure in detail. 
3.2.1 Task 1: Stock Market Design 
We call the first treatment “stock market design” because of its affinity to a stock market – al-
though the terms “stock” and “market” are actually not used in the experiment to avoid framing ef-
fects. The treatment covers three rounds, with each round consisting of 14 periods, numbered period -3 
to 10. Our subjects trade in six different goods, labeled good 1 to 6. To facilitate comparison of results 
across subjects, all subjects are faced with the same price paths, meaning that price paths are fixed for 
each round of the treatment. We vary the order in which subjects pass through rounds 1 to 3 and the 
labels for the six goods in each round to prevent subjects from noticing that they are all playing an 
identical game. The purpose of periods -3, -2, and -1 is only to provide price information, therefore 
our subjects are allowed to purchase and sell units of the six goods starting only at period 0. In period 
0, our subjects are given 2,000 units of experimental currency, but no units of any of the six goods. 
Over the following ten periods, i.e. period 0 to 9, they can use their endowment to buy units of the six 
goods, or sell units if they possess any. The only restrictions to our subjects’ transactions are that their 
money account as well as the number of units held for each of the six goods have to remain non-
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negative. In period 10 the round ends and subjects are informed about the final value of the goods. 
Figure 1 shows the computer screen for this task. 
(insert figure 1 about here) 
Every period, each of the six goods changes in value. Starting at 100 units of experimental cur-
rency, the price either increases by 6 % or decreases by 5 %, while the probability with which a good 
increases in value is constant over the whole round. Price changes are independent from previous price 
changes of that good, as well as current and previous price changes of all other goods. While subjects 
are informed how price changes are calculated, and that probabilities are constant, they are not told 
what the probabilities of the six goods actually are. As they are not provided with a priori probabilities 
they cannot rely on simple Bayesian updating, but rather have to deal with ambiguity. Probabilities are 
chosen to replicate three different kinds of market regimes: an upward moving market, a neutral mar-
ket, and a downward moving market. Under the neutral market regime we have two goods exhibiting a 
negative trend (probabilities for price increase 40 % and 45 %), two goods set up to oscillate around 
the starting price of 100 (probabilities 50 %), and two goods with an upward moving trend (probabili-
ties 55 % and 60 %). The upward and downward moving markets are similar to the neutral market, but 
omit the one good with the lowest or highest probability of price increase and exchange it with another 
good offering the same probability as the best or worst good, respectively. 
While our subjects are not informed about the real probabilities underlying the six goods, they 
could heuristically derive simple probability estimates by counting the number of times a certain good 
increased in value and dividing this measure by the number of periods played. A good that moved up 
in value more often than it decreased in value is likely to move up again while a good that decreased in 
value most of the time is likely to expect another price downturn. In period 0, subjects could assess the 
underlying probabilities by analyzing price changes in periods -3 to 0. In period 1, subjects should 
update these probability estimates based on the additional price change between period 0 and 1. 
Probability estimates thus change each period – and so should allocations. Depending on a sub-
ject’s risk aversion, a variety of different strategies could be optimal. If a subject is risk neutral or risk 
averse, he or she should never buy or hold any units of a good with a current subjective probability 
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estimate for further price increases lower than 45.45 %.3 Ignoring diversification effects, or assuming 
risk neutrality, a subject should invest only in the highest priced good. If there are multiple goods shar-
ing the highest price, the subject should divide his endowment equally over these goods. An optimal 
strategy thus generally requires that a subject holds on to the goods that moved up in value, and thus 
probably show unrealized gains, and to sell the goods that decreased in value and show unrealized 
losses. Hence, a disposition effect is a clear mistake under our design. 
To determine a subject’s payout for this task, one round is chosen randomly. We calculate the 
subject’s wealth at the end of period 10 as the sum of his or her money account and the current value 
of holdings in goods. Payout equals 0.2 % of this sum.  
3.2.2 Task 2: Housing Design 
The second individual choice task, which we call “housing design”, is distinct from the first 
one in a multitude of dimensions. While we try to avoid framing in the stock market treatment, our 
housing treatment is based on a real life background story. Another difference is that in our housing 
treatment, subjects only need to decide when to sell, while in the stock market treatment both purchas-
ing and selling decisions have to be made. Finally, our second individual choice task does not rely on 
probability updating so that rational strategies are easier to discover and implement. As the housing 
treatment is less time consuming than the stock market treatment, we play a total of six rounds. Price 
paths are again the same for all subjects, and the order in which subjects pass through rounds 1 to 6, as 
well as the house labels, are again assigned randomly. Figure 2 shows the computer screen of the 
treatment. 
(insert figure 2 about here) 
Our subjects are told that they have just inherited five different houses from a distant relative. 
They neither want to inhabit these houses themselves, nor rent them to other people, but instead want 
to sell them during the next five years, i.e. between 2005 and 2010. Hence they need to decide each 
year if and which houses they want to sell. Once a house is sold, the subject can never repurchase it, 
and houses that are not sold in 2009 are sold automatically in 2010 for their current price. The market 
                                                     
3  If the probability estimate is 45.45 %, the expected price change is just 0.4545 · 0.06 + 0.5454 · -0.05 = 0. 
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value of each of the five houses is € 200,000 in 2005. In subsequent years each house price either in-
creases or decreases by € 30,000. Subjects are told that price changes are independent of previous 
price changes and, as all houses are situated in different residential areas, price changes are indepen-
dent across houses. They are also informed that probabilities of price increases and decreases are equal 
for all houses but abate over time. If a subject decides not to sell a house in 2005, it increases in value 
with a probability of 65 %. In 2006, this probability decreases to 55 %, while it drops to 50 %, 48 %, 
and 45 % over the years 2007 to 2009. 
From a normative point of view, the game can be split into in a sequence of lotteries, which 
offer either a gain or a loss of € 30,000. Similar to the stock market treatment, normative strategies 
depend on risk aversion. While almost all subjects should be willing to play the first lottery, which 
offers a 65 % chance of winning, a risk neutral subject would quit the lottery sequence for 2007 or 
2008. Holding a house longer than 2008 can only be explained by risk seeking. Note that unrealized 
gains and losses, which are building blocks of the disposition effect, do not affect – or by changing 
current wealth only marginally affect – rational strategies in this treatment. Subjects should sell their 
houses regardless of their current price, since the lottery is the same for every price level. Exhibiting 
the disposition effect in this task becomes costly if a subject sells a winner too early, and thus misses a 
lottery with a high probability of winning, or holds on to a loser too long and thus accepts a lottery 
which he or she normally would refuse to play, e.g. a lottery with negative expected payoff. 
We determine a subject’s payout for this task by randomly choosing one of the six rounds and 
calculating total revenues. Payout equals 0.0002 % of this sum. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in May and June 2005 at the University of Mannheim and con-
sisted of two parts. We chose a four-week interval between the first and the second part for testing 
time stability. Both parts of the experiment included the stock market treatment and the housing treat-
ment, but subjects were not told that they were going to repeat exactly the same tasks.  
  11
Our analysis is based on 78 male and 35 female students, who participated in both parts of the 
experiment.4 Approximately half of all subjects studied economics and business administration, while 
the other half’s fields of study were not related to economics, e.g. computer science, sociology or law. 
The average age was 24, the average academic year was 3.2. The experiment was conducted in a com-
puter laboratory using the experimental software zTree (Fischbacher 2007). To ensure that everyone 
understood the rules and computer screens, subjects had to go through short tutorial sessions. The 
average processing time was approximately 45 minutes for each part of the experiment. The average 
payout was € 12.32, with a standard deviation of 40 cents. A translation of the German instructions 
can be found in the appendix. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Definition of Variables 
In the field and both individual choice treatments, we calculate individual disposition effects 
based on the number of times an investor sells at gains or losses. Results are nevertheless unchanged if 
we base individual disposition effects on the amounts realized. Instead of only counting how many 
times an investor sells for a gain or a loss, we relate actual sales to selling opportunities as done by 
Odean (1998). Doing this ensures that our results are not affected by a lack of selling opportunities. 




gainatsalesof#PWR =          
(2) 
lossatiesopportunitsellingof#
lossatsalesof#PLR =          
The individual level disposition effect is just the difference between these two variables and is thus 
specified as 
(3) PLRPWRDE −= . 
                                                     
4  We excluded twelve subjects who only participated in the first part of the experiment. Their behavior in the 
first part, however, did not differ from the other subjects’ behavior. 
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DE measures vary between –1 and 1. Investors with a measure of 1 quit an investment every 
time it contains an unrealized gain, while they never quit investments with unrealized losses. Hence, 
they exhibit the strongest possible disposition effect. The opposite is true for investors with a DE 
measure of –1, while a measure of 0 means that the investor does not base his or her selling decisions 
on unrealized gains and losses. 
In the field, selling opportunities are only counted on those days where the investor decides to 
sell at least one of his or her stocks. This procedure is similar to Odean (1998) and Grinblatt and Kelo-
harju (2001), and tries to control for the fact that some investors in the field might monitor their port-
folios more regularly than others. We count a selling opportunity at a gain (loss) for each stock in the 
investor’s portfolio trading at a price above (below) the average purchase price. For each stock the 
investor actually sells, we count a sale at a gain or at a loss, as appropriate. Results are robust if we 
alternatively define the reference point as the first, the most recent, or the highest purchase price. 
In the stock market treatment, we derive individual level disposition effects by analyzing our 
subjects’ selling behavior through periods 1 to 9. Although robust under different specifications, we 
again apply the weighted average purchase price as a reference point. We count a selling opportunity 
at a gain (loss) whenever a subject owns at least one unit of the good in question, with the price of the 
good being above (below) the average purchase price. Whenever a subject decides to sell one or more 
units of the good, we count a sale.  
In the housing treatment, we measure our subjects’ disposition effects over the years 2006 to 
2009. In each round and each year we count a selling opportunity at a gain (loss) whenever the house 
is still in the subject’s possession and its value is above (below) its starting price of € 200,000. If the 
subject actually decides to sell the house, we count a sale at a gain or loss, as appropriate. 
4.2 Disposition Effect on Aggregate 
We test whether investors in the field or subjects in our experimental treatments exhibit the dis-
position effect, i.e. hypothesis 1. On average, individual investors in our field data set utilize their op-
portunities to sell in 30 % of all cases if the stock is in the gain domain. If the stock, conversely, trades 
below the average purchase price, its selling frequency drops to 20 %. The average investor therefore 
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exhibits a disposition effect of approximately 0.09. Compared to our result, Odean (1998) reports an 
aggregated disposition effect of 0.05 for U.S. discount broker clients. Besides a general disposition 
effect, we also detect a remarkable heterogeneity among investors. Of those 2,614 investors for which 
we are able to calculate the disposition effect5 a significant majority of 1,711 investors (65.46 %) is 
positively affected (p = 0.0000 using a binomial test). Nevertheless, a considerable number of 903 
investors (34.54 %) exhibit a behavior unaffected by or even opposite to the disposition effect, selling 
losers more frequently than winners.  
In the experiment, if subjects are unaffected by unrealized gains and losses and apply a random 
trade strategy, we expect an average DE measure of 0 in all treatments.6 Table 2 shows mean PWR, 
PLR, and DE measures. . 
(insert table 2 about here) 
Subjects use their selling opportunities in the stock market treatment following gains almost 
twice as regularly as they use their selling opportunities following losses. They also sell their houses in 
the housing treatment almost twice as often if the house price exceeds the starting price of € 200,000 
than if it is below its starting price. Hence, disposition effects in our experiment are even stronger than 
disposition effects in the field. Our findings are comparable to the results reported in Weber and Ca-
merer (1998). While using a different method for calculating disposition effects, Weber and Camerer 
report that 59 % of all shares sold in their experiment were winners, 36 % losers, and 5 % trading at 
break-even prices. In our experiment, the majority of subjects exhibit positive individual level disposi-
tion effects, although in all tasks a considerable number of subjects, varying between 24 (21.24 %) and 
50 (44.25 %), follow the opposite strategy. The number of subjects with positive disposition effects is 
significantly higher than 50 % for all tasks but the stock market design in the second part of the expe-
riment. It should also be noted that by exhibiting the disposition effect, our subjects leave money on 
                                                     
5  PWR and PLR measures are only defined for those investors who have at least one selling opportunity at a 
gain or at a loss. 
6  Sometimes it can be rational to sell a good with unrealized capital gains. This is the case if during a round 
another good catches up in price and is now as likely to increase in value as the good that is already in the 
subject’s possession. If this is the case, the subject could sell some of the units of the good he already pos-
sesses and buy units of the other good to decrease his portfolio risk. 
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the table. The strategies our subjects play lead to an average payout of € 12.32, compared to a payout 
of € 13.28 if the simple heuristic strategy were applied. 
4.3 Symmetry 
While, in accordance with Dhar and Zhu (2006), we find individual differences among all in-
vestigated measures, we still do not know how these individual differences relate to each other: Are 
those investors with a pronounced tendency to sell their winners early the same investors who are ex-
tremely reluctant to sell their losers (hypothesis 2)?  
(insert figure 3 about here) 
At a first glance, PWR and PLR measures in the field are indeed positively and significantly 
correlated, as shown in the left-hand graph of figure 3. Spearman’s correlation coefficient between 
PWR and PLR equals 0.31 (p = 0.0000). Investors who realize their winners frequently thus also sell 
their losers relatively often. 
This correlation, however, could be artificially generated by the general definition of PWR and 
PLR. Since Odean (1998), both measures are usually calculated as the number of sales divided by the 
number of selling opportunities at gains or losses, respectively, with selling opportunities only counted 
on those days where the investor sells at least one of his stocks. If, however, investors normally only 
sell one stock on each selling day and some investors hold larger portfolios than others, these investors 
also generate many selling opportunities compared to actual sales. This in turn leads to PWR and PLR 
measures being negatively correlated to portfolio size.7  
To control for the possible influence of portfolio size on PWR and PLR, we regress both meas-
ures on logarithmic portfolio size using a two-sided censored Tobit regression. Portfolio size is there-
fore defined as the number of different stocks in the investor’s possession. The residuals of this regres-
sion constitute the part of PWR or PLR which cannot be explained by differences in portfolio size. 
The resulting correlation of residuals is shown in the right-hand graph of figure 3: there is no interde-
                                                     
7  As a simple example, think of an investor who has N stocks in his portfolio. All stocks trade above the refer-
ence point and are thus considered as winners. If on each selling day the investor only sells shares in one of 
his stocks, his PWR measure equals 1/N. Thus, under these strong assumptions, PWR is a strictly decreasing 
function of the number of different stocks in the portfolio. 
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pendence between proportions of winners realized and proportions of losers realized after controlling 
for portfolio size. Spearman’s rank correlation equals 0.00 (p = 0.8655). 
Again, our experiment may serve as a robustness check. In our experimental treatments, we 
control for portfolio size in the way that every subject is assigned the same initial endowment. Portfo-
lio sizes therefore differ only marginally. Figure 4 plots PWR and PLR measures for both the stock 
market and the housing treatment. 
(insert figure 4 about here) 
It reveals that there is no systematic correlation between PWR and PLR. Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients are with both -0.13 economically and statistically insignificant (p = 0.1691 and p = 
0.1587). 
To sum up, we find strong evidence of individual differences concerning the disposition effect 
as well as its two building blocks: realization of winners and loss realization aversion. Most important-
ly, we find that investors who sell their winners frequently are not the same investors who hold their 
losers until they have caught up with the purchase price. An investor with a certain level of disposition 
effect might, for example, exhibit the bias to this amount, because he never sells his losers or because 
he always sells his winners right away. In both cases the investor shows only one side of the disposi-
tion effect, i.e. loss realization aversion or a tendency for cashing in his gains immediately, while his 
behavior concerning gains or losses, respectively, may be close to rationality. 
4.4 Relative Stability within Tasks, across Tasks, and across Time 
We test for relative stability of the two building blocks of the disposition effect within tasks, 
across tasks, and across time, i.e. hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c. To disentangle stability from learning, we 
define the disposition effect as being stable if investors exhibiting a relatively strong disposition effect 
in one year of the field data sample period, or round, task, or part of the experiment, also belong to the 
high disposition effect group in all other years, another round of the same task, another task, or the 
next part of the experiment, respectively. Hence, stability does not necessarily mean that investors do 
not learn over time. It only means that – if investors learn at all – learning does not change the ranking 
of investors. 
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The field gives us the opportunity to perform an in-depth analysis of stability across time, i.e. 
hypothesis 3c. By comparing individual disposition measures across years, over the whole sample 
period we obtain average time intervals between one and three years. Over years, of course, individual 
investment strategies, wealth levels, or expectations may change, which in turn affect individual stabil-
ity. If we nevertheless find significant correlations in individual disposition measures across years, this 
should be a convincing finding for stability across time. Table 3 reports the results of the correlation 
analysis. 
(insert table 3 about here) 
First, the table reveals that both proportions of winners realized and proportions of losers rea-
lized are highly and significantly correlated with average correlation coefficients of 0.40 for PWR and 
0.37 for PLR measures. Furthermore, correlations of PWR and PLR indeed decrease over the length of 
the time interval, supporting our assumption that external influences, like changing investment strate-
gies or changes in wealth levels, impact selling behavior over time. 
One might worry, however, that this stability is driven by an effect already discussed in section 
4.3: As PWR and PLR measures are affected by portfolio size, portfolio size could also serve as an 
external stabilizer for these measures. Stable portfolio sizes thus could enforce stable disposition ef-
fects: If an increase in portfolio size leads to more selling opportunities, but does not affect the number 
of sales on a selling day, PWR and PLR drop by a certain percentage. Hence, if an investor in all years 
manages a relatively small (big) portfolio, PWR and PLR should be relatively high (low) in all years. 
To control for the stabilizing impact of portfolio size we perform additional robustness checks for all 
considered measures. In a first robustness check we regress PWR and PLR on logarithmic portfolio 
size using a censored Tobit regression, and correlate only the resulting residuals. We do not report the 
results, as correlations decrease only by a small amount.. 
In the next paragraphs, we examine our experimental data. We begin by testing for stability 
within tasks, i.e. hypothesis 3a. Table 4 shows correlation coefficients as well as p-values in paren-
theses for the three different market regimes in the stock market design of the first and the second part 
of the experiment. 
(insert table 4 about here) 
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The table reveals that PWR and PLR measures are highly correlated across rounds. For PWR meas-
ures, all correlation coefficients are higher than 0.5. We perform the same tests for the second individ-
ual choice treatment and obtain similar results.  
Stability across tasks (hypothesis 3b) is investigated by comparing individual disposition ef-
fects across both individual choice tasks for the same part of the experiment. On the other hand, we 
test for stability across time (hypothesis 3c) by analyzing changes in individual level disposition ef-
fects between the first and second parts.8 Again, test statistics are based on Spearman’s rank correla-
tion coefficients. Table 5 documents the results. 
(insert table 5 about here) 
Each correlation matrix can be split up into three different parts. The upper left-hand and the lower 
right-hand section of each matrix show correlations across tasks for the first and second parts of the 
experiment. Correlation coefficients across time are documented in the lower left-hand section. For 
individual level PWR (PLR), we find significant correlations across tasks, with correlation coefficients 
of 0.15 (0.30) for the first and 0.0.29 (0.34) for the second part of the experiment. Correlations across 
time for the same task are even stronger with coefficients of 0.73 (0.47) for the stock market and 0.38 
(0.53) for the housing treatment. 
Summing up, we find consistent evidence for stability within tasks, across tasks, and across 
time. Stability across time is supported by both experimental and field data, while our tests for stability 
within and across tasks are only based on our individual choice experiments. We conclude that indi-
vidual attitudes for selling winners and holding losers do not vary much within tasks, over tasks, or 
over time, but appear rather to be a stable personal characteristic. 
4.5 Learning, sophistication and other determinants of the disposition effect and its sub-effects  
Relative stability does not necessarily mean that investors do not learn within a task or over 
time. While an investor might throughout the entire field data sample period, in all rounds of a task, or 
both parts of the experiment belong to the high disposition effect group, learning may nevertheless 
decrease individual biases in this and all other groups. We test for learning, i.e. hypothesis 4, in two 
                                                     
8  Note that the two parts of the experiment are separated by a four-week interval. 
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different ways. Firstly, we utilize our field data set and test whether investors in the field learn over 
years. Therefore we test whether in the second half of the sample period, individual investors’ disposi-
tion effects are closer to 0. Secondly, we analyze our experimental data and test for learning within 
tasks, i.e. over rounds, and learning over time, i.e. between the first and second parts of the experi-
ment. We consequently test whether individual disposition effects decrease over rounds or between the 
first and second parts of the experiment.  We test for sophistication and other effects by running a re-
gression with PWR, PLR, and DE as dependent variables.  
We begin by looking at our field data. We test empirically whether investors starting with pos-
itive disposition effects, are, over the years, able to reduce their tendency to sell winners and hold los-
ers. In addition, we also test whether those investors starting at negative DE measures sell their win-
ners more and their losers less often as time progresses. Table 6 presents the results. 
(insert table 6 about here) 
As hypothesized, both investor groups learn over time and correct their behavior towards a selling 
strategy not based upon aggregated capital gains or losses. While the positive DE group decreases its 
average DE measure significantly from 0.29 to 0.10, the average DE measure of the negative DE 
group shows a significant increase from -0.21 to -0.02. A ranksum test reveals, however, that even 
after learning, investors starting at positive initial DE measures exhibit significantly higher disposition 
effects than investors starting at negative levels (p = 0.0000). While learning, positively affected in-
vestors decrease their proportions of winners realized and increase their proportions of losers realized, 
and vice versa for negatively affected investors.  
To ensure our findings are not biased by portfolio size, as discussed in subsections 4.3 and 4.4, 
we again perform two different robustness checks. First, we regress PWR, PLR, and DE on portfolio 
size using two-sided censored Tobit regressions and analyze the residuals only. Second, we calculate 
individual disposition effects not as the difference, but as the ratio between PWR and PLR. Table 6 
documents means as well as p-values for those measures in the four right-hand columns. As all effects 
retain their signs and are still highly significant, we confirm our preceding results. 
In the second step, we test whether subjects in our experiment learn within tasks, i.e. whether 
individual disposition effects decrease from round to round, resp. from the first part of the experiment 
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to the second part. We first compare individual level disposition effects in the first round(s) played by 
a subject with his or her disposition effects in later rounds. 
(insert table 7 about here) 
As table 7 reveals, subjects reduce their individual disposition effects significantly in the housing 
treatment as well as the second part of the stock market treatment. The attenuation of the disposition 
effect is based on both a reduction of subjects’ tendencies to sell winners too quickly and an increase 
in subjects’ willingness to sell their losers. 
Second, we test whether subjects in the experiment similar to investors in the field also learn 
over time, i.e. between the first and the second part of the experiment. Table 8 documents average DE, 
PWR, and PLR measures as well as p-values. 
(insert table 8 about here) 
Although the disposition effect is present in both parts of the experiment, individual level DE meas-
ures decrease considerably over time. Subjects, again, reduce their bias by both selling losers more 
often and winners less often. 
Having found an effect of learning, we finally want to shed some light on which factors might 
influence the effects. We regress proportions of winners realized, proportions of loser realized, and 
individual disposition effects in the field on trading habits and individual characteristics. We also 
present results for the overall individual disposition effect, to indicate that gain as well as loss side can 
be responsible for the effect. For the regression analysis we use ordinary least squares as well as cen-
sored Tobit regressions. 
(insert table 9 about here) 
Our regression analysis provides us with three significant explanatory variables for individual 
level disposition effects, and effects for the gain and loss side. Individual disposition effects decrease 
with income and the total number of trades during the sample period, but increase if an investor fol-
lows an aggressive trading strategy. Compared to the average DE measure of 0.09, the reported effects 
are, with coefficients of -0.03 or 0.04, also economically significant. Table 9 reveals that rich investors 
exhibit lower disposition effects mainly because they sell their losers more often, while their PWR 
decreases only insignificantly. Trading experience, on the other hand, reduces individual investors’ 
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tendencies for selling winners and increases their willingness to sell losers. Finally, investors follow-
ing aggressive investment strategies cash in their winners much more frequently than other investors. 
Concerning losers, however, these investors exhibit trading habits that equal those of all others. 
5 Discussion 
The combination of our field data set and our laboratory experiment allows us to derive several 
new insights concerning individual level disposition effects. Splitting the disposition effect into its two 
components, i.e. investors’ tendencies for cashing in winners and their reluctance to sell losers shows 
that, on an individual level, the two sides of the disposition effect are not systematically related. Those 
investors exhibiting a strong tendency to quit winning investments quickly are not necessarily the 
same investors who stick to their losing ones. Instead, some investors seem to be particularly biased 
towards “cashing in”, while others cannot overcome their “loss realization aversion”. This finding of 
general asymmetry constitutes an antithesis to how the disposition effect is usually depicted in beha-
vioral finance models (see e.g. Grinblatt and Han 2005). 
We also show that these individual differences are not merely random but stable on an individu-
al level within tasks, across tasks, and across time. Investors’ attitudes towards winners and losers thus 
appear as stable personality traits. Unaffected by this general stability, we also find that learning with-
in tasks and over time reduces the magnitude of this bias. Finally, in a regression analysis based on our 
field data set, we highlight possible determinants of the above-mentioned heterogeneity. We find that 
individual investors with high incomes are more likely to sell their losers, while investors following 
aggressive investment strategies tend to realize their winners more frequently. Trading experience, on 
the other hand, makes investors sell their winners less and their losers more often. 
By proving evidence on general stability and learning, our paper sets the foundations for pre-
vious as well as future research concerning the identification of disposition effect investors, the causes 
of the disposition effect, its impact on market prices and volume, and possible counteractive measures. 
However, while investors might be individually classified as being either more or less affected by the 
disposition effect, one should be aware that the disposition effect actually constitutes two separate and 
uncorrelated biases. On an individual level, investors often either appear to have a preference for cash-
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ing in winners quickly or are reluctant to sell losers, while they behave quite rational concerning the 
other side of the disposition effect.. 
Based on our findings, it might also be of value to further investigate why certain investors are 
so interested in selling their winners or are so reluctant to sell their losers, i.e. an in-depth analysis on 
the interdependence between an investor’s personal characteristics as studied in psychology, financial 
sophistication, etc. on one side and his investment decisions on the other. The question is whether 
those people exhibiting above-average investment biases do so due to a lack of understanding of the 
market they trade in or the game they play, a lack of general or specific financial sophistication, or 
emotional reactions unrelated to rational decision making. The impact of frequent trading on invest-
ment sophistication in particular requires further research. 
For practitioners in finance and banking it should be valuable information that their customers’ 
individual disposition effects are indeed stable over tasks and time. Practitioners could apply this in-
formation in two different ways: They might either identify biased investors and help them to counter 
their investment mistakes by providing specific information or by offering learning tools, e.g. via the 
internet. Customers who are aware of this additional service could be willing to pay a premium for 
good investment advice. Conversely, financial engineers might use our findings to create financial 
products that exploit their customers’ loss realization aversion. Products e.g. might be framed in a way 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (field) 
This table summarizes the data used in our field data study. We report investor characteristics, information on 
their trading behavior, and their portfolio size. While our data set contains 3,079 individual investors, only 2,978 
investors trade in Euro or German Mark and are therefore considered in our analysis. Investor characteristics 
were collected by the discount broker when the investors opened their accounts. Investment experience and in-
come were collected in ranges or categories, respectively. 
Investor characteristics Trades 
# of accounts  2,978 # of trades Mean 82.85
in dataset   Median 44.00
   Std. dev. 133.23
Age in years Mean 40.92   
 Median 39.00 Trading  Mean 536,206
 Std. dev. 10.24 volume Median 142,769
 # of obs. 2,463 in Euro Std. dev. 1,794,121
    
Gender Female 144 (4.84 %)  Portfolios 
 Male 2,834 (95.16 %) # of stocks Mean 5.52
 # of obs. 2,978 (100.00 %) per month Median 4.29
   Std. dev. 4.72
Investment 0 – 5 years 1,024 (43.95 %)   
experience 5 – 10 years 1,256 (53.91 %) Portfolio Mean 36,088
 10 – 15 years 15 (0.64 %) value per Median 14,675
 Over 15 years 35 (1.50 %) month  Std. dev. 93,149
 # of obs. 2,330 (100.00 %)   
    
Income 0 – 50  140 (12.83 %)   
in thousand 50 – 100  469 (42.99 %)   
German 100 – 150  314 (28.78 %)  
Marks 150 – 200  101 (9.26 %)  
 Over 200  67 (6.14 %)  
 # of obs. 1,091 (100.00 %)  
   
Investment High current profits 67 (2.87 %)  
strategy No strategy 1,247 (53.45 %)  
 Retirement savings 112 (4.80 %)  
 Short term capital gains 77 (3.30 %)  
 Speculative 360 (15.43 %)  
 Well-balanced 470 (20.15 %)  











Table 2: Disposition effect on aggregate (experiment) 
The table reports mean values for proportions of winners realized (PWR), proportions of losers realized (PLR), 
and individual level disposition effects (DE) for both tasks and both parts of the experiment. The next two col-
umns report the number of subjects exhibiting DE measures higher than, smaller than, or equal to zero. P-values 











≤ 0 p 
First Stocks 0.38 0.14 0.24 83 30 0.0000 
 Housing 0.46 0.20 0.26 89 24 0.0000 
Second Stocks 0.28 0.21 0.07 63 50 0.1294 




Table 3: Correlations of PWR and PLR measures (field) 
This table reports Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between individual level proportions of winners rea-
lized (PWR)and between proportions of losers realized (PLR) over years, i.e. between 1997 (year 1) and 2000 
(year 4), for our field data study. P-values are given in parentheses. 
PWR Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4  PLR Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Year 1 1.00     Year 1 1.00    
Year 2 0.40 (0.0000) 1.00   
 
Year 2 0.39 (0.0000) 1.00   
Year 3 0.32 (0.0000) 
0.48 
(0.0000) 1.00  
 
Year 3 0.35 (0.0000)
0.40 
(0.0000) 1.00  












Table 4: Correlations of PWR and PLR measures within the first and second parts 
of the stock market treatment (experiment) 
 
The table reports Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between individual level proportions of winners rea-
lized (PWR) and between proportions of losers realized (PLR) over rounds 1 to 3 in the stock market treatment 
for the first and second parts of the experiment. P-values are given in parentheses. 
PWR, 1 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 PWR, 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Round 1 1.00   Round 1 1.00   
Round 2 0.62 (0.0000) 1.00  Round 2
0.68 
(0.0000) 1.00  
Round 3 0.63 (0.0000) 
0.61 






PLR, 1 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 PLR, 1 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Round 1 1.00   Round 1 1.00   
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Round 2 0.31 (0.0009) 1.00  Round 2
0.61 
(0.0000) 1.00  
Round 3 0.32 (0.0009) 
0.39 






Table 5: Correlations of PWR measures across tasks and time (experiment) 
The table reports Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between proportions of winners realized (PWR) and 
between proportions of losers realized (PLR) for the stock market treatment and the housing treatment, and the 
first and second parts of the experiment. P-values are given in parentheses. 
PWR  First part Second part 
  Stocks Housing Stocks Housing 
First 
part Stocks 1.00    






(0.0536) 1.00  






PLR  First part Second part 
  Stocks Housing Stocks Housing 
First 
part Stocks 1.00    






(0.0028) 1.00  







Table 6: Learning over time (field) 
This table shows mean values for proportions of winners realized (PWR), proportions of losers realized (PLR), 
and individual level disposition effects (DE) for both those investors starting at positive and those starting at 
negative disposition effects. Mean values are reported separately for the first (1997 to 1998) and second (1999 to 
2000) halves of the field data sample period. The first three entries report mean values for standard PWR, PLR, 
and DE measures, with DE defined as the difference between PWR and PLR. The next three columns report 
mean values of residuals of PWR, PLR, and DE resulting from a two-sided censored Tobit regression using 
portfolio size as the single explanatory variable. The last column shows mean values for an alternative disposi-
tion effect measure which is calculated as PWR / PLR. P-values are based on signtests which compare individual 
measures for the first and the second part of the sample period. 














Positive 97 – 98 0.43 0.14 0.29 0.07 -0.05 0.22 3.24 
DE 99 – 00 0.31 0.20 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.03 2.60 
 p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Negative 97 – 98 0.17 0.38 -0.21 -0.13 0.16 -0.23 0.51 
DE 99 – 00 0.20 0.22 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 1.23 
 p 0.0456 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 7: Learning within tasks (experiment) 
This table shows mean values for proportions of winners realized (PWR), proportions of losers realized (PLR), 
and individual level disposition effects (DE) for the stock market and the housing treatment. Mean values are 
reported separately for the first and second parts of the experiment as well as for first round(s), i.e. round 1 in the 
stock market and rounds 1 to 3 in the housing treatment, and later rounds, i.e. rounds 2 and 3 in the stock market 
and rounds 4 to 6 in the housing treatment. P-values are based on signtests which compare individual measures 
between the first round(s) and later rounds. 














First part First round(s) 0.40 0.14 0.27 0.50 0.20 0.30 
 Later rounds 0.38 0.15 0.23 0.48 0.24 0.24 
 p 0.2754 0.0519 0.1713 0.3468 0.1204 0.0407 
Second part First round(s) 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.39 0.24 0.15 
 Later rounds 0.27 0.21 0.08 0.41 0.29 0.12 
 p 0.0092 0.5429 0.0898 0.2060 0.0009 0.0297 
 
Table 8: Learning over time (experiment) 
This table shows mean values for proportions of winners realized (PWR), proportions of losers realized (PLR), 
and individual level disposition effects (DE) for the stock market and the housing treatment. Mean values are 
reported separately for the first and second parts of the experiment. P-values are based on signtests which com-
pare individual measures between both parts. 













First part 0.38 0.14 0.24 0.46 0.20 0.26 
Second part 0.28 0.21 0.07 0.40 0.24 0.15 
P 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 0.0035 0.0000 0.0003 
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Table 9: Determinants of PWR, PLR, and DE measures (field) 
The table documents the results of simple ordinary least squares regressions as well as two-sided censored Tobit 
regressions. We regress proportions of winners realized (PWR), proportions of losers realized (PLR), and indi-
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Figure 1: Computer screen for stock market design 
The figure shows a translation of the computer screen for the stock market treatment. The rows in the upper table 
represent the six goods, the columns represent periods -3 to 10. Cells in the upper table contain two types of 
information: The upper figure is the price of the corresponding good in this period. The number underneath 
shows how many units of this good the subject purchased (positive number) or sold (negative number) in this 
period. The first column in the bottom table shows the subject’s current holding of the six goods. In the next 
column you again see the current price per unit of the corresponding good. Next to the prices, the lower table 
contains twelve buttons, labeled “sell 1” and “purchase 1” which the subject could click for purchasing and sell-
ing single units of the six goods. Below the small table you see the current money account. If the subject decided 
to continue to the next period, he could click on the “Next Period” button at the lower right-hand corner of the 










Figure 2: Computer screen for housing design 
The figure shows a translation of the computer screen for the housing treatment. The rows in the table represent 
the five houses the subject inherited. Columns represent years 2005 to 2010. Cells in the table contain two types 
of information: The upper entry is the price of the house in the corresponding year. If the subject decided to sell 
the house in a particular year the comment “sold” appears underneath the price. Beneath the table you see a row 
containing the probabilities of price increases for all years. The bold probability is the current one. Next to the 
table you see 5 buttons labeled “sell house 1” to “sell house 5” which the subject could click to sell the corres-
ponding house. If the subject decided to continue to the next year, he could click on the “Next Year” button at 











Figure 3: Correlations between PWR and PLR measures (field) 
The graphs plot the correlation between proportions of winners realized (PWR) and proportions of losers rea-
lized (PLR) for the field data study. Each dot stands for an investor’s PWR / PLR combination. Black dots mark 
individual level disposition effects (DE) higher than 0, while negative or zero disposition effects are market by 
white dots. The left-hand graph shows the correlation between standard PWR and PLR measures as defined in 
section 4.1. The right-hand graph plots the same correlation for PWR and PLR residuals resulting from a two-
sided censored Tobit regression using portfolio size as the single explanatory variable. 
Uncontrolled PWR and PLR Controlled PWR and PLR 
 
 
Figure 4: Correlations between PWR and PLR measures (experiment) 
The graphs plot the correlation between proportions of winners realized (PWR) and proportions of losers rea-
lized (PLR) for both experimental treatments. Each dot stands for a subject’s PWR / PLR combination. Black 
dots mark individual level disposition effects (DE) higher than 0, while negative or zero disposition effects are 
market by white dots. 
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